Introduction
The probability of an LWR severe accident with reactor core meltdown is infinitely low, since it requires combination of several engineered safeguard system failures. Such an accident would nevertheless have serious consequences, including release of radioactivity outside the reactor containment. Accident prevention is, firstly, a matter of suitable reactor design (according to the "defense in depth" principle) and safeguard system actions. These must then be backed up by preventive accident management that also helps mitigate accident consequences, through use, for example, of hydrogen recombiners to reduce risk of deflagration in the containment. Finally, assessing the chronology, compositions and levels of radioactive releases is a necessary prelude to preparing relevant emergency plans. "Integral" computer codes are designed to couple significant physical phenomena occurring in different zones of the reactor and to simulate the actuation of safeguard systems via procedures or operator requests. To cover a large number of scenarios, it was necessary to compromise, in developing ASTEC, between the desired degree of precision in results and the time required to perform calculations: a whole accident day can thus be simulated in a few hours on a PC. Finding the right compromise is a real challenge to such codes. The ASTEC integral package, jointly developed by IRSN and GRS since 1996, has multiple applications, including:
• Evaluation of possible releases of radioactivity outside the containment; • PSA2 4 studies, including determination of uncertainties;
• Accident management studies, with emphasis on measures for prevention and mitigation of severe accident consequences; • Phenomenological analyses of scenarios to improve understanding of physical phenomena, as part of the support for experimental programs. ASTEC integrates state-of-the-art, severe accident modeling into a processing structure so flexible that it evolves to accommodate subsequent input from R&D. It supplements the "mechanistic" codes, which describe certain aspects of an accident in much greater detail (e.g. IRSN's ICARE/CATHARE core degradation code). 
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Description of ASTEC
The ASTEC code has a modular structure (figure 1) . Each of its modules simulates a different reactor zone or set of physical phenomena. To illustrate this, a typical sequence of severe accident events is described below, along with a brief summary of the corresponding physical phenomena (the relevant ASTEC module is given in parentheses):
• the "front end" phase (CESAR module) begins with an initiating event, e.g. a primary system break. Two-phase coolant flows then develop in reactor coolant system loops, and there is loss of primary coolant inventory.
• the core heats up due to inadequate residual heat removal, and vessel water level diminishes. The core degrades (DIVA module) with steam-induced exothermic oxidation of the zircaloy fuel cladding and associated hydrogen production; molten core material (termed "corium") then forms at high temperature (up to 3000 °C) and flows down through the core; it may subsequently relocate to the lower vessel plenum, where its buildup heats the core bottom head until the latter either becomes molten or ruptures mechanically.
• fission products (FPs) are released from degraded fuel rods (ELSA module); the first of these -fission gases and the most volatile species -are followed, after still more severe rod degradation, by actinides and low volatility FPs. Structural materials such as those of control rods or assembly grids are released in vaporized form.
• resulting aerosols and FP vapors are transported by the steam flow through the primary system (SOPHAEROS module) to the containment. They may then be deposited and later resuspended. Depending on chemical interactions, species may vary, especially in the gas phase.
• following vessel bottom head rupture, primary pressure causes the corium to be discharged into the reactor pit. A fraction of the high temperature corium may thereafter be entrained into the containment and contributes to its heat-up. This is called the DCH 1
phase. (RUPUICUV module).
• the corium remaining in the pit interacts with basemat concrete (MCCI 2 phase)-(WEX module), which leads to ablation of the concrete layer and release of noncondensable gases (H 2 , CO, CO 2 ,etc.) in the containment.
• the containment atmosphere heats up due to injection of steam, FPs and aerosols (CPA module) , with a resulting rise in pressure. Some aerosols are then deposited on containment wall surfaces. Combustion of hydrogen accumulating in the containment is then possible, and may cause dynamic loading of the containment walls.
• iodine behavior in the containment is an important factor (IODE module); this element adsorbs onto or desorbs from containment walls and its chemical and physical characteristics are modified in the sump and gas phases after chemical interactions. Other modules describe the behavior and transport of residual heat, along with the activity associated with fission products in the reactor (ISODOP module) and the management of safeguard systems such as containment spray or the accumulator tanks (SYSINT module). A "dynamic" database (meaning a base that evolves as calculations are performed) enables data exchanges between modules (see figure 2). The ASTEC code totals some 300,000 instructions, The safety of nuclear reactors [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . In ASTEC, the containment can be discretized into several cells or zones (as is habitually the case of socalled "lumped-parameter" codes), each representing an actual walled compartment (dome, bunkers, etc.). With version V0.3, however, calculation only begins at the start of core uncovering: another code must then be used to simulate primary and secondary system thermalhydraulic behavior during the "front end sequence" of the accident. A new version (V1) of ASTEC was completed in mid-2002. This version has two significant advantages -complete scenario simulation capability (including the "front end" phase) and improved core degradation modeling. 
ASTEC operating modes.
"Coupled mode" is used to couple all or some of the modules and enables explicit feedback between them. Each module operates with its own time step, within a macro-time step determined by the code. Standalone mode is used for separate validation of the modules against experimental data. , etc.) which focus on a single phenomenon (known as SET or "separate effect" tests) or on several of them (CET or "coupled effect" tests); and • integral experiments, designated as "IT" (e.g.
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Phebus FP, CORA 3 etc.). Such applications are used to verify that phenomena coupling is suitably reproduced and that no phenomena are omitted. This often requires large-scale testing, for better extrapolation to reactor scale. Application to the severe accident of 1979 at the TMI-2 reactor (United States) is also an essential part of this process. To supplement the above, validation is currently being extended, as part of the EVITA project, to a number of reference experiments, most of which are included in a list of code comparison exercises selected by the OECD (ISP 4 ). Results of validating version V0 against twentyfive experiments proved globally satisfactory: discrepancies observed in respect to experimental measurements were usually within acceptable limits. Two examples of SOPHAEROS module validation are given below:
• the first involved test no. 18 of the FALCON program carried out in Great Britain in the 1980s, to study the mechanisms of interaction between fission product vapors and aerosols. This experiment simulated the transport and deposition of certain fission products (cesium, iodine, etc.) in a tube, in the presence of elements released by a degraded control rod (silver, indium and cadmium). The total fraction of cesium deposited in the tube at the end of the test amounted to 75% of the injected mass versus 54% predicted by the code. Allowing for experimental uncertainties, in particular those associated with FP source kinetics, this result can be considered acceptable. As shown in figure 3 , deposition profiles -and specifically
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Figure 3
Validation of SOPHAEROS against FALCON-18.
Curves depict the end-of-test calculated versus measured profiles of cesium deposition along a thermal gradient tube (meshed by the code into 10 cylindrical cells). Allowing for experimental uncertainties, in particular those associated with FP source kinetics, calculated total deposits and deposition profiles can be considered acceptable. The zone of maximum deposition is correctly reproduced by the code, but it underpredicts deposited quantities. In the first portion of the tube, at high temperature, measured deposits are not reproduced by the code; however, the quantities involved are low.
the zone of maximum deposition -are qualitatively reproduced by the code.
• the second used Phebus FP test FPT-1 (IRSN, Cadarache). Here, fission products released by the fuel bundle, whose kinetics vary over time, were injected into the primary system. Figure 4 shows a comparison of measured and calculated FP retention in the system. While good correlation was observed for total retention, retained cesium and tellurium were underpredicted in the hot leg and overpredicted in the steam generator. The code correctly reproduces the different behavior of iodine, particularly in gaseous form, in the hot leg, with respect to other fission products. However, certain phenomena with strong impact on reactor safety have yet to be accurately reproduced or fully understood. These remaining challenges primarily concern:
• degraded core reflooding and its consequences on hydrogen production and FP release; • "late-phase" phase core degradation and possible in-vessel corium cooling; • effect of high-burnup fuel and MOX fuel on core degradation and FP release; • MCCI, specifically as regards long-term corium coolability. R & D programs centering on these topics are currently underway at IRSN or in an international frame. The next version of ASTEC will include improvements of certain relevant models on the above fields. In parallel, new ASTEC V1 modules are already being validated. For example, CESAR simulation of a high-pressure scenario (known as TMLB 1 : loss of SG feedwater with failure of the emergency core cooling systems) in a 900 MWe PWR has been compared to the results of the French thermal-hydraulic code CATHARE, which ensures detailed modeling of two-phase steam-water flows. Discrepancies with relation to this code were within the accuracy margin set for ASTEC, e.g. 10% [for reactor coolant pressure or time of core uncovering (Figure 5) ]. Curves depict calculated end-of-test profiles of FP (iodine, cesium and tellurium) deposition along the primary coolant system (upper plenum and vertical line, hot leg, SG tube, cold leg). Measurements taken at specific points in the system are shown together with their experimental uncertainties.
Figure 5 CESAR/CATHARE Comparison.
Curves depict reactor coolant pressure changes over the first two hours of the TMLB scenario (with application of French procedure H2). CESAR reproduces all of the associated trends: rapid increase on SG blowdown at approximately 1900 s, plateau after start of SEBIM valve cycling, sudden drop when these valves are blocked open and, finally, slow, regular decrease, then leveling off at around 20 bar. Discrepancies with respect to CATHARE reference results are less than 10% in relative value.
Reactor applications
The ASTEC code is being used actively for PSA2 studies performed by IRSN on a French 900 MWe pressurized water reactor. A sizeable number of scenarios, which differ in terms of initiating event or safeguard system actuation, are analyzed (see an example of a typical analysis tool in figure 6) . Results of an ASTEC V0 TMLB calculation show that the code successfully describes most of the relevant phenomena and safeguard systems, as illustrated below. On SG dryout, the core heats up and reactor coolant pressure increases. SEBIM pressure relief valves then open to preclude overpressurization of the RCS. At that instant, a large quantity of steam is released into the containment. The accumulator tanks cannot actuate due to high RCS pressure (from 160 to 165 bar, with SEBIM valve regulation). Core uncovering begins 5700 seconds after reactor trip and, 2000 s later, the core is completely uncovered (figure 6). This marks the start of an intensive core degradation process (figure 7), with production of more than 200 kg of hydrogen due to steam oxidation of the zircaloy fuel cladding. During this phase, hydrogen, structural materials and FPs are released to the containment in the form of gases and aerosols via the SEBIM valves. About 70 tons of corium relocate to the vessel lower plenum and begin heating it. The DCH phase commences on rupture of the vessel bottom head caused by high reactor coolant pressure; corium is discharged from the vessel, dispersed through the cavity and partially (about 70 tons) entrained into the containment. This is followed by the MCCI phase, involving unentrained corium debris still present in the cavity ( figure 8, page 44) . On vessel failure, the containment spray system is actuated (at a containment pressure greater than 2.4 bar), causing a rapid drop in this pressure (figure 9, page 44). Spray washes the aerosols down into the sump. Hydrogen stratification is achieved in some compartments, with maximum value observed at the top of the dome. In the longer term, containment pressure increases due to noncondensable gas release from MCCI. Total hydrogen production amounts to nearly 1000 kg (note that recombiner action is not accounted for in this calculation). Containment venting initiates if pressure reaches the 5 bar threshold.
In addition to application in IRSN reactor studies, ten of the European partners in the EVITA project are evaluating ASTEC capacity to correctly simulate several severe accident scenarios for different reactors concepts (900 and 1300 MWe French PWRs, EPR, and VVER 440 and 1000) and to account for a majority of safeguard systems and procedures. Comparisons are The safety of nuclear reactors Figure 7 Illustration of core degradation state after corium formation (TMLB-type scenario).
This molten pool forms at the center of the core, slightly below core mid-height. A crust of primarily metal composition surrounds and supports the liquid corium. Then comes a bed of oxides and metal debris, with an overlying cavity several cubic meters in volume.
Figure 6
Online visualization of ASTEC V0 results for the reactor coolant system during a severe accident.
then conducted with reference codes such as MELCOR (US/NRC) and MAAP4 (EPRI). The code has likewise been distributed to several organizations in Eastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine, etc.), under the European Commission's TACIS 1 program, to encourage its use in supporting safety assessments of currently operating and future VVERs.
Preliminary conclusions for this set of ASTEC V0 simulations designate two areas in which further gains are necessary: simulation of initial accident phase (before core uncovering) and user-friendliness (use of appropriate MMI 2 tools). The first of these is the main objective of the new ASTEC version (V1). Application of this code to current VVER-1000s has confirmed its capacity to suitably represent most safeguard systems. But various yet-to-be improved points were identified for VVER-440s, namely representation of the metal shroud that surrounds each rod bundle in the core and of the lower, fuel-containing portions of control rods.
Future work on ASTEC
The main focus of current efforts is version V1, which was delivered in mid-2002. Major applications for this version in 2002 are the TMI-2 accident and the Phebus FP integral test FPT-1 (selected by the OECD as ISP exercise no. 46). The next stage, slated to begin in 2003, will entail "consolidating" this version and incorporating relevant feedback from PSA2 applications and work on the EVITA project. Initiatives in favor of strengthening ASTEC's position as EU reference code should yield tangible results within the 6th FRDP. The first users club, involving some 20 organizations, will be set up in 2003. Certain key areas for model improvement issues have already been identified for next version V2: degraded core reflooding, MCCI, extension to BWRs, processing of uncertainties (in materials properties, modeling, etc.). Ongoing code validation is also on the agenda, particularly in future IRSN experiments (ARTEMIS for MCCI, EPICUR and CHIP for fission product behavior, and MADRAGUE for fuel rod degradation).
1 -Technical Assistance to the Community of Independent States.
-Man-Machine
Interface.
Figure 9
Illustration of containment pressure trends (TMLB-type scenario).
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Figure 8
Illustration of reactor pit basemat erosion by MCCI (TMLB-type scenario).
The two-dimensional erosion is attributable to the corium still remaining in the pit (not entrained into the containment during DCH).
